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Introduction
It may seem obvious that the First Amendment protection due
political speech not be diminished in any way merely because the
political message is rendered through artistic expression. But art can
be a difficult concept for governmental officials, judges, and the
general public to understand. To many, the idea that art is something
worthy of constitutional benevolence is foreign. As the First
Amendment Center's annual survey has revealed, less than 50
percent of those polled in 1997, 1999, and 2000, 2002 and 2003
believed that people should be allowed to display in a public space art
that has content that might be offensive to others.1 And as recently as
1996, the City of New York, perhaps this country's cultural capital,
urged a court, unsuccessfully, to find that because some artwork
purportedly failed to communicate ideas it should receive very
limited First Amendment protection.2
Politics and art have always been a volatile mix. But doctrinally
that volatility has been productive. The capacity for artistic
expression to relay political thought-and the history of art being a
medium for political commentary and debate-was central to the
gradual recognition by the United States Supreme Court of what has
become a vigorous First Amendment protection for almost every
medium of artistic expression.
Nevertheless, the appearance of overtly political art has brought
about numerous legal challenges to freedom of artistic expression
founded on the belief by government that art funded or exhibited by
a public agency should be devoid of political or any "controversial"
thought, and be rather merely aesthetically pleasing.
These incidents require a consideration of a fundamental
question: why is artistic expression entitled to such strong
constitutional protection? Is it only because of art's capacity for
communicating ideas? Or is art protected simply for art's sake,
regardless of whether there is a discernible message being expressed?
Hazards abound in each choice. In protecting art only because
it communicates articulable ideas, one threatens to exclude art the
communicative aspect of which is more elusive. And in including all
art, one will inevitably force before courts the thoroughly undesirable
threshold question of "what is 'art'?"
1. First Amendment Center, State of First Amendment, 28 (2003) available at
http://www.freedomforum.org.
2. Bery v. New York, 97 F.3d 689, 695 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1251
(1997) (overruling Bery v. New York, 906 F. Supp. 163, 168 (S.D. N.Y. 1995)).
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This article will consider these issues in the context of legal
conflicts that have arisen when government funds the creation or
presentation of art. This article will first review the evolution of the
First Amendment doctrine of freedom of artistic expression. This
article will then consider a district court decision regarding the
Esperanza Peace and Justice Center which directly addressed the
question of political advocacy in artistic expression.
What is learned is that artistic expression is treated somewhat
differently than other forms of speech. Art is protected "speech" even
if it contains no readily discernible message. But when art does
contain a discernible, political message it certainly should not be
penalized.
I.

The Supreme Court Had Established Previously that
Artistic Expression, Across All Arts Media, is
Protected by the First Amendment

That art might be deserving of constitutional protection is a
relatively recent jurisprudential development. With the exception of
literature,3 the Supreme Court did not contemplate whether artistic
expression was "speech" as used in the First Amendment until less
than fifty years ago.
Artistic performances were deemed to be insufficiently
expressive when first examined by the Supreme Court in 1915. In
Mutual Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n,4 the Supreme Court rejected
the plea that an Ohio statute that empowered a board of censors to
approve for exhibition only those films that were "of a moral,
educational, or amusing and harmless character" violated the
5
freedom of speech as guaranteed by the Ohio Constitution. The
Court held that the exhibition of movies was:
3. See Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119 (1973) ("A book seems to have a
different and preferred place in our hierarchy of values, and so it should be."). Generally,
early First Amendment cases treated the written word as coming under the protection of
the freedom of the press clause and the spoken word as coming under the freedom of
speech clause.
4. 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915).
5. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was applied only to the federal
government until 1925. In Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925), the Supreme
Court held for the first time that the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First
Amendment was within the liberties safeguarded by Due Process Clause of the 14'
Amendment and thus protected against actions by state governments as well. As a result,
before 1925, cases challenging state laws abridging the freedom of speech were brought
solely as challenges to the free speech clauses of state constitutions rather than the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
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[A] business, pure and simple, originated and conducted for profit,
like other spectacles, not to be regarded, not intended to be
regarded by the Ohio Constitution, we think, as part of the press of
the country, or as organs of public opinion.

By implication, the Court's reasoning applied as well to other
artistic presentations deemed "spectacles,"
presumably live
performances that were considered to be primarily pleasing to the eye
rather than a vehicle for opinion.
It was not until 1952 that the Court forsook that ruling and found
that "expression by means of motion pictures is included within the
free speech and free press guaranty of the First and Fourteenth
8
Amendments.,
The idea that all artistic expression was under the aegis of the
First Amendment concretized in the Supreme Court in the 1970s.
This occurred not so much as a result of specific media of expression
being before the Court but as a general recognition of the expressive
quality of art. Thus, the Supreme Court stated the constitutional
protection due the visual arts-"pictures, films, paintings, drawings,
and engravings"-as a given, in a case in which it examined whether
an un-illustrated book, thus characterized by its absence of visual art,
was legally obscene. 9
Perhaps most significantly, the Supreme Court set forth that
"serious artistic value" was one of the factors-along with
literary,
political, and scientific value-that distinguished "obscenity," which is
not protected by the First Amendment, from protected sexual
material. ° From here on out a court could look at art not only as a
6. Mutual Film Corp., 236 U.S. at 244.
7. Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary (1913) defined "spectacle" as
"something exhibited to view; usually, something presented to view as extraordinary,
or as
unusual and worthy of special notice; a remarkable or noteworthy sight; a show; a pageant;
a gazingstock," and listed "show; sight; exhibition; representation; pageant" as synonyms.
8. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952).
Although film maybe considered to be a relatively new medium for artistic expression,
almost all of the jurisprudence declaring that art is protected by the Fist Amendment flows
from that case.
9. Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119-20 (1973). The Supreme Court had earlier
acknowledged, although not in an arts context, that visual images are "a primitive but
effective way of communicating ideas ... a short cut from mind to mind." W.Va. State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943).
10. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). The Court set out a three pronged-test
for determining obscenity: "(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary
community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as
a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Id. (citations omitted).
The third prong of the test replaced an earlier and more expansive requirement that the
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form of expression worthy of First Amendment protection, but
indeed as a defining quality of protected speech.
Live theatrical performances received the Court's implicit
blessing in 1970." However, the medium's status of deserving full
First Amendment protection was not made definitive until some five
years later when the Court rejected the 2argument that live
expression:1
performance was more conduct than
By its nature, theater usually is the acting out-or singing out-of
the written word, and frequently mixes speech with live action or
to hold theater subject to a
conduct. But that is no reason
drastically different standard. 3
However, the Supreme Court still stopped short of announcing a
rule that all artistic expression was within the First Amendment. The
Court noted instead that "[e]ach medium of expression, of course
by standards suited
must be assessed for First Amendment purposes
4
problems.",'
own
its
present
may
each
to it, for
Nevertheless, despite this caution, and perhaps because in
hindsight it seemed foolish to have waited so long, the Court quickly
came to regard artistic expression as an ages-old component of
protected speech. As it wrote less than ten years later:
By excluding live entertainment throughout the Borough, the
Mount Ephraim ordinance prohibits a wide range of expression
that has long been held to be within the protections of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. Entertainment, as well as political and
ideological speech, is protected; motion pictures, programs
broadcast by radio and television, and live entertainment, such as
musical and5 dramatic works, fall within the First Amendment
guarantee.

material be "utterly without redeeming social value." Id. at 24-25 (rejecting the test set
forth in Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasurev. Massachusetts,383 U.S. 413,419 (1966)).
11. Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 63 (1970) ("An actor, like everyone else in
our country, enjoys a constitutional right to freedom of speech.").
12. Previously, the Court, considering the constitutionality of an ordinance that
prohibited sexually explicit live performance in places where alcohol was served,
acknowledged that "theatrical productions are within the protection of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments." California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 116-17 (1972). However,
the Court had cautioned that "as the mode of expression moves from the printed page to
the commission of public acts that may themselves violate valid penal statutes, the scope
of permissible state regulation significantly increases." Id. at 117.
13. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557-58 (1975)
(considering the denial of a permit to stage a production of Hair at two Tennessee
theaters). Notably, the Court also described two municipal theaters as "public forums
designed for and dedicated to expressive activities." Id. at 555.
14. Id. at 557.
15. Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981) (emphasis added).
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By the time the Supreme Court was presented with its first
opportunity to discuss the extent to which government could regulate
certain aspects of a musical performance, it was not contested that
"[m]usic, as a form of expression and communication, is protected
under the First Amendment.' ' 16 And by 1995, the Court had realized
the "unquestionable" First Amendment protection due even abstract
works.17
A.

Art Was Protected as Speech Because of its Capacity to Communicate
Ideas, Particularly Political Ideas

The Supreme Court's acceptance of artistic expression as within
the liberty of free speech afforded by the First Amendment was
founded on the recognition of a very basic concept that was perhaps
more obvious in the arts community than in the legal one. In most of
the cases discussed above, the Supreme Court reasoned that artistic
expression should be constitutionally protected because art not only
communicates ideas, but because it is very often a powerful medium
18
for conveying political beliefs.
As the Supreme Court stated in the seminal case regarding
artistic expression:
It cannot be doubted that motion pictures are a significant medium
for the communication of ideas. They may affect public attitudes
and behavior in a variety of ways, ranging from direct espousal of a
political or social doctrine to the subtle shaping of thought which
characterizes all artistic expression. The importance of motion
pictures as an organ of public opinion is not lessened by the fact
that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform. 19
The Court also relied on its previous observation about literary
works that "[e]veryone is familiar with instances of propaganda
through fiction. What is one man's amusement, teaches another's
doctrine." 20
16. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,790 (1989).
17. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995).
18. David Cole, Beyond UnconstitutionalConditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality
in Government-FundedSpeech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 675, 739-40 (1992) (noting that art has
been a "frequent target of political repression by totalitarian governments, reflecting those
governments' judgments that it is a forum for dissent and opposition"); Barbara Hoffman,
Law for Art's Sake in the Public Realm, 16 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTs 39, 45, 65 (1991)
("It is difficult to draw a bright line between art that communicates political ideas and art
that does not.").
19. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952).
20. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948). See also Schacht v. United States,
398 U.S. 58, 63 (1970), in which the Court noted that the First Amendment rights afforded
an actor included "the right openly to criticize the Government during a dramatic
performance"; Farmers Educational & Coop. Union v. WDAY, 360 U.S. 525, 529 (1959)
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Similarly, in discussing music, the Court focused on that
medium's historic role in political discourse and the necessity of
protecting such expression to preserve a democratic system:
Music is one of the oldest forms of human expression. From Plato's
discourse in the Republic to the totalitarian state in our own times,
rulers have known its capacity to appeal to the intellect and to the
emotions, and have censored musical compositions to serve the
needs of the state.21
Other courts have echoed the high court's observations. The
Second Circuit in explaining "the essence of visual communication
and artistic expression," stated:
Visual art is as wide ranging in its depiction of ideas, concepts and
emotions as any book, treatise, pamphlet or other writing, and is
similarly entitled to full First Amendment protection .... The ideas

and concepts embodied in visual art have the power to transcend
these language limitations and reach beyond a particular language

group to both the educated and illiterate.... One cannot look at

Winslow Homer's paintings on the Civil War without seeing, in his
soldier,
the individual
depictions of the boredom and hardship ofthat
war is not heroic.
expressions of anti-war sentiments, the idea
The California Supreme Court emphasizing art's long historical
role in public debate noted that "[l]ong before the advent of printing
and motion pictures the theater constituted 'a significant medium for
the communication of ideas." '23 As that court explained:
Use of the theater to depict current events, as distinguished from
religious pageantry, was first attempted by Aeschylus, and refined
by Euripides and later by Aristophanes who mastered comedy....
Fear of the political potential of the potential of the theater was
manifest when James I published an ordinance forbidding
representation of any living Christian king upon the stage. Since
1624 the lord chamberlain has had censorship control of the English
theater24

This line of reasoning is consistent with the way the Court has,
purposes of the First Amendment, identified "speech" in
the
for
other contexts. In defining the concept of symbolic speech, the Court

(noting that the "art of radio broadcasting" is an important medium for delivering political
messages).
See also Sefick v. City of Chicago, 485 F.Supp. 644, 652 n.19 (1979) (finding that a
sculpture criticizing the mayor's snow removal efforts "possessed socio-political content"
and finding it significant for First Amendment purposes that it was obscured in an attempt
to silence this expression).
21. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,790 (1989).
22. Bery, 97 F.3d at 695.
23. Barrows v. Municipal Ct., 1 Cal. 3d 821, 824, n.4 (1970) (quoting Joseph Burstyn,
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 505 (1952)).
24. Id.

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[27:359

has strived to determine whether the conduct is "sufficiently imbued
with elements of communication."'s
B.

Artistic Expression is Also Protected for its Own Sake Even if it
Communicates No Articulable Message

However, the Supreme Court has also made clear that art is
"speech" protected by the First Amendment even if it is not
so
"imbued" with communicative elements. Art is thus not merely a
subcategory of "conduct," which is included in the First Amendment
only if it is "expressive" or "symbolic."
Rather as the Court wrote in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.:
[A] narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of
constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions
conveying a 'particular message,' would never reach the
unquestionably shielded paintings of Jackson Pollock, music of
Arnold Schonberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.26
Indeed the Court contemplated such a result as early as 1948. In
considering whether "pulp" literary works that were arguably not
"informative" were also protected by the First Amendment it
rejected the assertion that "the constitutional protection for free press
applies only to the expression of ideas" and noting that the "line
between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the
protection of that basic right. '2' In contrast, in the first half of the
twentieth century, courts tended to focus on whether the written
work had some societal value. 2'
Treating artistic expression differently than other expression
makes sense. If art were protected as "speech" only because it
communicates ideas or can be politically effective, we risk art not
being valued solely for its contribution to society-art for art's sakebut only because it is more concretely functional. Such an approach
threatens the exclusion of art the communicative aspect of which is

25. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,409 (1974).
26. 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995); See also Piarowski v. Illinois Community College, 759
F.2d 625, 628 (7th Cir. 1985)("[T]he freedom of speech and of the press protected by the
First Amendment has been interpreted to embrace purely artistic as well as political
expression.").
27. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
28. See Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) ("The liberty of the press is
not confined to newspapers and periodicals.... The press in its historic connotation
comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and
opinion.").
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not as readily appreciated.29 Moreover, a court may be forced to
consider the communicative value of each piece of art before it to
0
determine to which level of constitutional protection it is entitled.
Indeed, courts have struggled with the "communicative aspect"
of art. A federal appeals court reversed a trial court's finding that
artist Chuck Close's First Amendment rights had been violated when
the University of Massachusetts removed his paintings from the
corridors of the student union because they were thought to
"inappropriate."31 The appeals court rejected Close's contention that
art is as fully protected by the Constitution as political or social
speech, finding instead that the protection due speech depends not on
32
the medium of expression, but on the subject matter. The court
found that "[t]here is no suggestion, unless in its cheap titles, that
plaintiff's art was seeking to express political or social thought"
despite the fact that the paintings addressed the social issues of
juvenile sexuality and sexual abuse.33
And even the Bery court, despite its glowing language about
visual art, 4 distinguished the visual art at issue before it from craft
arts such as silversmithery and pottery because the latter lacked
communicative aspects. "While these objects may at times have
expressive content, paintings, photographs, prints and sculptures...

29. "The Court's treatment of the Speech Clause tends to devalue the extrarational,
nondiscursive elements of art because its doctrine places so much freight upon ideas....
The marketplace of ideas paradigm, which permeates the speech cases, tends to
undervalue art by only recognizing its political, rational, discursive potential." Marci A.
Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND. L. REV. 73, 105-12 (1996) (describing the Supreme
Court's treatment of art before Hurley).
30. Hamilton, supra note 29, at 109.
31. Close v. Lederle, 424 F.2d 988, 989 (1st Cir. 1970). The specific legal holding of
Close, that Close's First Amendment rights were outweighed by the rights of those who
were forced to see his paintings, has been called into serious question following later
Supreme Court cases such as Cohen v. California,403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (holding that an
individual had a First Amendment right to wear a jacket with "Fuck the Draft" written on
it in a courthouse despite the captive audience) and others discussed herein.
32. "Plaintiff makes the bald pronouncement, 'Art is as fully protected by the
Constitution as political or social speech.' It is true that in the course of holding a motion
picture entitled to First Amendment protection, the Court said that moving pictures affect
public attitudes in ways 'ranging from direct espousal of a political or social doctrine to the
subtle reshaping of thought which characterizes all artistic expression.' However, this
statement in itself recognizes that there are degrees of speech." Close, 424 F.2d at 989-90
(citations omitted).
33. The "cheap titles" specifically referred to by the court were "I'm only 12 and
already my mother's lover wants me" and "I am the only virgin in my school." Id.
34. See Bery, 97 F.3d 689.
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always communicate some idea or concept to those who view it, and
as such are entitled to full First Amendment protection.35
Dance as a medium has proved to be quite problematic. 6
Although the Supreme Court has not had the occasion to discuss
ballet, classical or modern dance performance, it has many times
considered the expressive elements in nude dancing in "adult
entertainment establishments." The Supreme Court has found that
nude dancing is somewhat expressive, but the effect has been only to
salvage a small modicum of First Amendment protection for the
medium rather than elevating to the level as other performing arts.37
However, even in the non-"adult" setting, the Court has not proved
much more accepting of dance's expressive elements. The Court, in
finding that "recreational dancing," in that case between 11-14 year
olds at a dance hall, was not sufficiently expressive as to be entitled to
First Amendment protection, apparently did not believe dance to
have any expressive element to set it apart from other "activity. ' 3
However, there are also pitfalls to be encountered in treating all
art as inherently expressive even if it communicates no articulable
message. In such situations, courts will inevitably be forced into the
thoroughly impossible legal question of "is this art?" As the definition
of art has been historically elusive, this model would indeed be
problematic.3 9
35. Id. at 696.
36. Hamilton, supra note 29,at 109 n.140.
37. See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (explaining that "nude dancing
of the type at issue here is expressive conduct that falls only within the outer ambit of the
First Amendment's protection"); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565 (1991);
Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
Anthropologist Judith Lynne Hanna, Ph.D. has written extensively on the
expressive elements of nude dancing and frequently provides expert testimony regarding
the artistry of exotic dance. Judith Lynne Hanna, Analysis: The First Amendment and
Exotic Dance, NATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION QUARTERLY 8,
Autumn 1998.
38. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989) ("[I]t is possible to find some
kernel of expression in almost every activity a person undertakes-for example, walking
down the street or meeting one's friends at a shopping mall-but such a kernel is not
sufficient to bring the activity within the protection of the First Amendment."). Cf Bella
Lewitzky Dance Co. v. Frohnmayer, 754 F.Supp. 774, 783 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (assuming
without discussing that fine art dance was artistic expression entitled to First Amendment
protection).
39. Compare this impossible question to the "serious artistic value" determination in
obscenity cases. Although arts professionals are able to articulate objective standards for
artistic value, these standards are readily mishandled in the legal realm. Cf Advocates for
the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 797 (1st Cir. 1976) ("This is not to say that the
standard of artistic merit is not an important goal, but only that it and guidelines
elaborating it do not lend themselves to translation into first amendment standards.")
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The practice of tattooing is an interesting illustration of this
conundrum. State courts have split on whether the conduct of
tattooing, as opposed to the tattoo itself, should be treated as artistic
expression. A Massachusetts court, applying Hurley, held that the act
of tattooing was the equivalent of creating artwork and was thus
protected by the First Amendment in the same way other creative
conduct was. 40 However, the South Carolina Supreme Court, relying
on Spence's requirement that conduct be "'sufficiently imbued with
elements of communication,"' struck down a similar ban. 41 It found
that "the process of injecting dye to create the tattoo is not
sufficiently communicative to warrant protections." 42
U. Where the Problems Arise: Political Spaces and
Publicly Funded Programs
A. Public Funding of the Arts is No Stranger to Controversy
The fact that our constitutional system embraces art as a mode of
political expression is hugely significant. To some it seems art has
value only as pretty pictures, as pleasantries. Art censorship incidents
frequently arise when this is not so, but rather when art is disturbing
or provocative, or when it challenges society's religious, sexual or
racial conventions, without being aesthetically pleasing.43
The failure to perceive art's non-aesthetic and political roles
becomes especially important in the realm of public funding of the
arts. Government may be placed in a position of financially assisting
the production or presentation of art that criticizes it, or that
challenges some of its citizens' moral strictures. In other contexts,
these would be the easiest of constitutional questions; the suppression
of speech because government disagrees with its viewpoint is the

(citations omitted). In obscenity cases, courts rely on the opinions of arts experts. See, e.g.,
Luke Records v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134, 138-39 (11th Cir. 1992) (reversing the findings of a
trial judge who had disregarded expert testimony supporting a finding of artistic value and
had instead applied his own personal observations). Yet the determination of whether a
work is "art" regardless of its "value" is even less susceptible of legal definition.
40. Lanphear v. Mass., Sup. Ct., Suffolk County, Case No. 99-1896-B (2000), at 10
(striking down Massachusetts ban on tattooing).
41. State v. White, 560 S.E.2d 420, 423 (S.C. 2002) (quoting Spence v. Washington,
418 U.S. 405,409 (1974)) (upholding a ban on tattooing).
42. Id. See also State v. Brady, 492 N.E.2d 34 (Ind.App. 1986); People v. O'Sullivan,
96 Misc.2d 52 (N.Y. Sup. App. Term 1978); and Yurkew v. Sinclair, 495 F. Supp. 1248 (D.
Minn. 1980) (all upholding restrictions on tattooing).
43. See generally, HEINS infra note 61.
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ultimate First Amendment taboo.' But because many perceive even
art's communicative aspect as limited, the question is not so easily
answered.
Controversies over public funding of the arts abounded in the
1980s and 1990s. A few examples follow.
In August 1993, the Cobb County (Georgia) Commission voted
to eliminate the full $110,000 it distributed to local arts organization
so that it could avoid supporting work that furthered the "gay
agenda." The Commission, responding to local theatrical productions
of David Henry Hwang's M Butterfly and Terrence McNally's Lips
Together, Teeth Apart, had sought to restrict its arts funding to
programs "that support strong community, family oriented
standards." They dropped the funding program rather than face
litigation over the constitutionality of the restriction.45
Two similar incidents occurred in North Carolina. In April 1997,
the Mecklenburg County Commission voted to cut its funding to the
local arts council so that it could fund art that promotes "the
traditional American values" directly. The commissioners took issue
with homosexuality themes in theatrical productions of Angels in
America and Six Degrees of Separation. In May 1996, Guilford
County commissioners transferred funding from the local arts council
to a school-based arts education program because it disapproved of
the arts council's support for a theater that had presented La Cage
Aux Folles.46
Out North Contemporary Art Center in Anchorage, Alaska has
been the target of similar challenges numerous times. In 1998, the
Anchorage Assembly rejected a recommended $22,000 arts grant
citing Out North's "controversial" and non-family oriented
programming. The previous summer Out North barely avoided a loss
of its city social services funding to conduct its summer theater
program for at-risk youth. And in 1993 and 1994, the mayor vetoed

44. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 92, 95 (1984) ("the principle of
viewpoint neutrality.., underlies the First Amendment").
45. David Greene, Georgia County Defunds Arts: Homophobia Causes Divisive
Debate, NATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION BULLETIN 1, Autumn
1993.
46. David Greene, Arts Under Attack in North Carolina,NATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION QUARTERLY 4, Summer 1997; David Greene, County
Commission Cuts Arts Funding Over Perverted Sexuality, NATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION QUARTERLY 3, Spring 1997.
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grants to Out North, only to have those vetoes overturned by the
Assembly.47

But one incident in particular, and the resulting litigation, shed
interesting light on what can happen when art and politics get mixed n
with public money.
8

B.

Esperanza Peace & Justice Center

1.

To San Antonio, Politics and Art Do Not Mix

On September 11, 1997, the San Antonio City Council voted to
eliminate all city arts funding to the Esperanza Center, an arts
organization nationally renowned for combining cultural arts
programming with social justice advocacy, from the 1998 budget.
Although the City Council gave no reasons for the cut, the decision
followed a campaign by a handful of local organizations: the groups
characterized Esperanza as promoting "the homosexual agenda,"
"deviant lifestyles," and being "pro-abortion," and "anti-family
values." The city's Cultural Affairs Board, the local agency charged
with reviewing arts grant applications, had recommended that
Esperanza receive over $62,000. 49 The City Council's action came
despite the fact that Esperanza had been rated as a highly qualified
applicant by the San Antonio Department of Arts and Cultural
Affairs. °
That artistic expression may be political advocacy, a concept
that as discussed above, has been instrumental in securing a place for
artistic expression in the First Amendment, was squarely at issue in
this case. During the course of the litigation that ensued, the city
claimed, in part,51 that Esperanza was not an arts organization, but a
47. David Greene, Out North Stripped of Local Funding,NATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION QUARTERLY 1, Spring 1998; David Greene, Anchorage
Theater Faces Funding Veto, NATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR EXPRESSION BULLETIN 1,
Winter 1994.
48. The facts of the case are set forth in detail in the court's opinion in Esperanza
Peace & Justice Center v. City of San Antonio, 316 F. Supp. 2d 433 (W.D. Tex. 2001).
49. This figure includes funding for the Gay and Lesbian Media Project and VAN,
two other arts projects for which the Esperanza Center served as the fiscal agent. In
response to the City Council's action, the city's Department of Cultural Affairs also
withheld $14,000 Esperanza was to receive through it from the Texas Commission on the
Arts. Elda Silva, Esperanza set to go to court, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, August 20,
2000 availableat http://www.express-news.com.
50. Id.
51. The City's primary justification was that Esperanza's funding was eliminated
because of a need to fund only basic services. Indeed, as part of the "back-to-basics"
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political one.52 The city claimed that political expression as a whole
was not properly subject to arts funding. As Mayor Howard Peak told
a local reporter, "they're pushing social causes. And we're talking
about arts money, not social causes money."5 3
The evidence adduced at trial made it even more clear that the
decision to fund Esperanza was based on the viewpoint expressed in
Esperanza's artistic presentations and the feeling that Esperanza was
too "political." At the August 2000 trial, several council members
asserted that Esperanza was "too political" and thus not truly an
"arts" organization. Yet they did not accuse Esperanza of engaging in
traditional "political" activity such as campaigning or lobbying. They
simply were uncomfortable that Esperanza addressed social issues
through its arts programming. One council member testified that
although political art is "just the nature of what art is," 54she believed
Esperanza had "overstepped its boundaries" in this way.
It was further revealed at trial that all but two of the eleven
council members had no first hand knowledge about Esperanza's
agenda, the City Council cut all arts funding by 15%. However, no other arts organization
had its funding zeroed out from the budget, except Esperanza. Silva, supra note 49.
52. Mike Greenberg, Passions, often political, fuel artists' works, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS, August 22,2000 availableat http://www.express-news.com.
The city's claim is belied by the fact that several non-arts organizations, such as
the Bexar County Detention Ministries, Jewish Community Center, Social Health and
Research Center, and Trinity Episcopal Church, were given arts funding for their arts
projects. Indeed, according to the city's own grant-making criteria, the nature of the
organization is irrelevant. Trial Testimony of Eduardo Diaz cited in Plaintiffs' Post-Trial
Brief 15, Esperanza Peace & Justice Center et al. v. San Antonio, 316 F. Supp. 2d 433
(W.D. Tex. 2001), available at www.esperanzacenter.org/litigation/trial/posttrialbrief/
pbrief.html. Mao Robbins, Esperanza trial focuses on motive, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESSNEWS, August 22,2000 availableat http://www.express-news.com.
53. Mayor Peak had earlier been quoted in the New York Times as saying, "They
seem to go way beyond what people want their money spent on. It is an in-your-face
organization." Judith Dobrzynski, San Antonio cuts subsidies for the arts by 15 percent,
N.Y. TIMES, September 12, 1997.
54. Maro Robbins, Council defunded Esperanza with little direct knowledge, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, August 23, 2000 available at http://www.express-news.com.;
Associated Press, Cultural arts group fights city in federal court for funding, August 23,
2000 available at http://www.ap.org. As set out in Esperanza's trial brief, one council
member testified that although the political expression was "the nature of art," Esperanza
had "overstepped its boundaries." Id.
There is some precedent for allowing the government to restrict political
expression as a category of expression as long as the government is careful to ban all
political content and not just that of a certain viewpoint. See Lebron v. National Railroad
Passenger Corp., 69 F.3d 650 (2d Cir. 1995) (upholding a policy that historically banned
political art from large billboard); Claudio v. United States, 836 F.Supp. 1219, 1227-30
(E.D.N.C 1993) (holding that the federal government could remove a large painting about
abortion from the lobby of a courthouse in part because such powerful political speech
was disruptive to the functioning of a governmental building).

2005]

WHY PROTECT POLITICAL ART AS "POLITICAL SPEECH"?

programming or its grant application, but instead relied on the media
coverage and the organized campaign against Esperanza. At least one
council member admitted that he voted to eliminate Esperanza's in
order to accommodate some constituents' concerns about the gay and
lesbian viewpoint expressed in some of Esperanza's art. Almost all
admitted that similar concerns controlled their decision.55
2.

Arts Funding as a Culturaland ConstitutionalConflict: National

Endowment for the Arts v. Finley
By the time the Esperanza incident arose, both the courts and
the public discourse were well familiar with arts funding
controversies.
The United States Supreme Court's 1998 decision in National
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998), as the
culmination of the "culture wars" of the 1980s and 90s was somewhat
of an anti-climax. After all, much was at stake. To many,
contemporary American art of the late 1980s and early 1990s had
become a symbol of the tension found throughout American society
between social liberalism and "family values" and Western-centric
thought and multi-culturalism. Art had moved from the point of
illustrating societal issues such as race, human rights, and gender roles
and sexual orientation to being the very stage upon which such issues
reached a flashpoint. As a result many saw the lawsuit as a cultural
Armageddon.
In its most basic form, NEA v. Finley5 6 addressed whether
language requiring the Chairperson of the National Endowment for
the Arts to ensure that "artistic excellence and artistic merit are the
criteria by which applications are judged, taking into consideration
general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and
values of the American public,"57 violated the First Amendment. The
Supreme Court, overruling two lower federal court decisions, found
that it did not.58

55. Trial Testimony of Bannwolf, Webster, Flores, Menendez, Guerrero, and
Vasquez cited in Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Brief 13-17, Esperanza Peace & Justice Center et al.
v. San Antonio, 316 F. Supp. 433 (W.D. Tex. 2001), available at www.esperanzacenter.org/
litigation/triallposttrialbrief/pbrief.htm. Maro Robbins, Esperanza tells offunding cutoff,
SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, August 21, 2000 available at http://www.expressnews.com; Maro Robbins, Council defunded Esperanza with little direct knowledge, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, August 27, 2000 availableat http://www.express-news.com.
56. 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
57. Id.; 20 U.S.C. §954(d)(1).
58. Finley, 524 U.S. at 573, 590.
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However, the Court's specific holding is largely fiction. It
construed the statute at issue to be constitutional only insofar as it
was ineffectual. Were the NEA to actually deny an otherwise
qualified grant because it found the proposed work "indecent," the
decency and respect clause could face a new constitutional challenge.
Congress added section 954(d)(1) to the enabling statute for the
National Endowment for the Arts in 1990. Prior to the amendment,
the enabling statute commanded the Endowment to award grants
based on "artistic and cultural significance, giving emphasis to
American creativity and cultural diversity," "professional excellence,"
and the encouragement of "public knowledge, education,
understanding, and appreciation of the arts."'5 9
The Decency and Respect Clause was not Congress's first
attempt to impose non-artistic standards on the NEA.6° The first
attempt came in 1984 in response to the NEA's support of a
production of Verdi's Rigoletto set amid the Mafia. Angered by the
use of Italian stereotypes, Representative Mario Biaggi proposed a
law that would have prohibited the use of NEA funds "in any matter
to denigrate any ethnic, racial, religious, or minority group.",6' The
proposed provision was not enacted.
The next efforts to reshape the Endowment's funding priorities
were the result of two grants, the subjects of which were soon to
become iconic of the culture wars.
In April 1989, the American Family Association attacked the
funding of a fellowship program at the Southeastern Center for
Contemporary Art, based in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. The
Center had awarded a $15,000 fellowship to photographer Andres
Serrano and had included his photograph Piss Christ in a traveling
59. Id. at 573.
60. The National Endowment for the Arts and the National Endowment for the
Humanities were established by Congress in 1965 to "foster and support a form of
education, and access to the arts and the humanities, designed to make people of all
backgrounds and wherever located masters of their technology and not its unthinking
servants" and to "help create and sustain not only a climate encouraging freedom of
thought, imagination, and inquiry but also the material conditions facilitating the release
of this creative talent." 20 U.S.C. § 951(4), (7). Originally, the Endowment was given wide
discretion to award grants. Congress stated only the broadest funding requirements,
including "professional excellence," "artistic and cultural significance," and "American
creativity and cultural diversity." Finley, 524 U.S. at 573.
61. MARJORIE HEINS, SEX, SIN & BLASPHEMY: A GUIDE TO AMERICA'S
CENSORSHIP WARS 120-21 (New York: New Press 1993). Heins also notes a previous
incident when a Member of Congress complained in 1972 that Erica Jong had received
NEA support while she was writing Fear of Flying. A legislative fix, however, was not
proposed.
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exhibit of Serrano's, and the other fellows', work. The photograph
depicted a wooden crucifix bathed in shimmering reddish-gold light.62
A few months later, controversy arose over "The Perfect
Moment," an exhibition of the works of photographer Robert
Mapplethorpe organized by the Institute of Contemporary Art at the
University of Pennsylvania. The exhibit was funded in part by a
$30,000 grant from the NEA. The exhibit included several
sadomasochistic and homoerotic photographs that members of
Congress were soon to denounce as pornographic. 63
Congress responded by enacting the Helms Amendment to the
NEA authorizing statute. The Amendment barred the use of NEA
funds to:
[P]romote, disseminate, or produce materials which in the
judgment of [the NEA] may be considered obscene, including but
not limited to depictions of sadomasochism, homoeroticism, the
sexual exploitation of children, or individuals engaged in sex acts
and which, when taken as a whole, do not have serious literary,
artistic, political or scientific value.6
In order to ensure compliance, the NEA adopted a requirement
that every grantee certify in writing that it would not use NEA funds
inconsistently with the Helms Amendment. 6 Two lawsuits were filed
contesting the constitutionality of the certification requirement. The
requirement was found to be unconstitutionally vague, 66 and the
NEA, in settling the lawsuits, agreed to remove it.
The decency and respect clause was the result of a congressional
compromise. It was adopted by Congress over two other proposals,
one that would have largely eliminated the NEA and one that would
have barred the funding of art that "has the purpose or effect of
denigrating the beliefs, tenets, or objects of a particular religion" or

62. David Greene, Piss Christ, CENSORSHIP, A WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA (London:
Fitzroy Dearborn, 2001). Nothing but the title indicated the nature of the pigmentation.
Senator Alphonse D'Amato famously tore up a reproduction of the photograph on the
Senate floor, saying that "Serrano is not an artist. He is a jerk."
63. Finley, 524 U.S. at 574. The Corcoran Gallery in Washington, D.C., fearing
controversy, canceled its scheduled exhibition of "The Perfect Moment." When the
exhibit appeared at the Contemporary Arts Center in Cincinnati, director Dennis Barrie
was arrested and tried on obscenity charges. Barrie was acquitted. JENNIFER A. PETER &
Louis M. CROSIER, THE CULTURAL BATTLEFIELD: ART CENSORSHIP & PUBLIC
FUNDING 155, 175 (Gilman, NH: Avocus Publishing 1995). HEINS, supra note 61, at 11112.
64. Finley, 524 U.S. at 575.
65. Id.
66. Bella Lewitzky Dance Co. v, Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
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"of denigrating an individual, or group of individuals, on the basis of
race, sex, handicap, or national origin." 67
The NEA's governing body, the National Council on the Arts,
resolved to implement its new mandate by ensuring that members of
the advisory panels that review and make funding recommendations
on grant applications "represent geographic, ethnic, and aesthetic
diversity." ' No other regulation was promulgated to meet the
amendment's requirements.
Prior to the enactment of the decency and respect clause, the
NEA informed four performance artists, Karen Finley, John Fleck,
Holly Hughes, and Tim Miller, the NEA4, that their grant
applications had been rejected by the National Council overruling the
recommendations of the advisory panels. Three months later, in
September 1990, the four filed a lawsuit contending, among other
claims, that their First Amendment rights had been violated because
their applications were rejected on political grounds. In March 1991,
after the decency and respect clause was enacted, the suit was joined
by the National Association of Artists' Organizations (NAAO), a
membership organization of artist-run organizations supporting new
and emerging works, and the constitutionality of section 954(d)(1)
was challenged directly. The NEA ultimately settled the individual
artists' cases, that is, that the statute was applied unconstitutionally to
them, by paying
them the amount of the grants, damages and
69
attorneys fees.

All that remained for the courts to consider was NAAO's
challenge that the statute was unconstitutional on its face. 70 On June
9, 1992, the federal trial court ruled that the decency and respect
clause was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and enjoined
enforcement of the provision.71 That ruling was affirmed by the Court
67. Finley, 524 U.S. at 576.
68. Id. at 577.
69. Id. at 577-78; PETER & CROSIER, supra note 63, at 30.
70. Finley, 524 U.S. at 577-78.
71. Finley v. NEA, 795 F.Supp. 1457, 1476 (C.D. Cal. 1992) [hereinafter Finley 1].
Despite the fact that the agency was prohibited from enforcing the decency and respect
clause, the pattern of controversial grants being denied funding over the recommendations
of the advisory panels continued. The National Campaign for Freedom of Expression
documented at least 12 such instances between June 1992 and June 1998. In one instance a
National Council member cited the need to be "sensitive to the nature of public
sponsorship" and respectful of "the clear message Congress has given." NATIONAL
CAMPAIGN FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, June 1998 at § S1-4.
During the same period of time, Congress continued to revise the Endowment's
procedures and practices. Most notably, in 1996, Congress slashed the NEA's budget by
40%, eliminated almost all grants to individual artists, and prohibited non-project specific
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of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 1996. 2 In each case, the court
decency
rejected the assertion that the NEA could comply with the
panels. 73
and respect clause simply by ensuring diversity in its
The Supreme Court reversed and upheld the decency and
respect clause as facially constitutional. The Court held that the
decency and respect clause did not impose a categorical requirement.
That is, it did not prevent the NEA from funding "indecent" or
"disrespectful" art and did not require that any factor be considered
for every grant. 74 And the Court held that there was no proof that the
NEA did or would actually deny grants because of "indecency" or
"disrespect."
But the Court did hold that if the NEA were to deny funding in
an effort to suppress particular viewpoints that would be
unconstitutional:
If the NEA were to leverage its power to award subsidies on the
"basis of subjective criteria into a penalty on disfavored viewpoints,
then we would confront a different case. We have stated that, even
in the provision of subsidies, the Government may not aim at the
suppression of dangerous ideas, and if a subsidy were manipulated
to have a coercive effect, then relief could be appropriate. In
addition, as the NEA itself concedes, a more pressing constitutional
question would arise if government funding resulted in the
to drive certain
imposition of a disproportionate burden calculated
75
ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.,
In other words, the NEA may consider decency in awarding arts
grants, but it cannot do much about it."
Thus, at least in theory, the First Amendment protects an artist's
right to create art expressing unpopular viewpoints, that is, works that
some might find indecent or disrespectful, with the support of
governmental subsidies. 77
funding such as seasonal and general operating support. Previously, the agency itself had
eliminated the practice whereby arts organizations could sub-grant to individual artists. Id.
72. NEA v. Finley, 100 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Finley II].
73. Finley 1, 795 F. Supp. at 1471; Finley II, 100 F.3d at 680 (holding that the agency
"has no discretion to ignore this obligation, enforce only part of it, or give it a cramped
construction").
74. Finley, 524 U.S. at 580-581.
75. Id. at 587 (citations omitted).
76. The Court did note that there were a few specific contexts in which the NEA

could exclude grants for indecent or disrespectful art such as school and youth programs.
Id. at 581.
77. It must not be disregarded that the Supreme Court did rule against NAAO and
the artists and that the relief these parties sought, the removal of the decency and respect
clause, was not granted.
Indeed, there is much to dislike about the Court's opinion from both an artistic
and legal standpoint. The Court based much of its holding on its perception that there was
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The initial wire service stories that went out within minutes of
the Court's release of the ruling grossly misreported this aspect of the
decision. The Associated Press lead with "The government can deny
cash grants to artists because their work is considered indecent, the
Supreme Court ruled today. 7 8 Likewise, Gannett reported that
"denying tax dollars to artists who present lewd or indecent material
does not violate the rights of people to express themselves."7 9

not a "realistic danger that § 954(d)(1) will compromise First Amendment values." Id. at
583. This conclusion is disturbing because it ignores the very real discouragement that
artists feel to apply for grants for works that might cross someone's decency and respect
line. And additionally, the Court justified this conclusion because it believed that "one
could hardly anticipate how 'decency' or 'respect' would bear on grant applications." Id.
Such unguided subjectivity, and vagueness in the First Amendment context is usually a
basis for invalidating a statute, not approving one. However, the Court held that when
"the Government is acting as patron rather than as sovereign, the consequences of
imprecision are not constitutionally severe" and thus Congress need not "legislate with
clarity." Id. at 589. Moreover, the Court held that in the context of competitive
governmental funding, the government could employ criteria that would not be
permissible in other contexts. Id. at 585.
These points form the basis of the dissenting opinion by Justice Souter which
largely adopted all of the positions set forth by NAAO and the artists. Id. at 600-23. As
Justice Souter wrote:
The decency and respect proviso mandates viewpoint-based decisions in the
disbursement of government subsidies, and the Government has wholly failed to
explain why the statute should be afforded an exemption from the fundamental
rule of the First Amendment that viewpoint discrimination in the exercise of
public authority over expressive activity is unconstitutional. The Court's
conclusions that the proviso is not viewpoint-based, that it is not a regulation,
and that the NEA may permissibly engage in viewpoint discrimination, are all
patently mistaken.
Id. at 600-01.
78. Laurie Asseo, OK Given not to fund indecent art, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 25,
1998, 11:44 Eastern Time availableat http://www.ap.org.
79. Supreme Court allows for funding denial for lewd art, GANNETT NEW SERVICE,
June 25, 1998. A later story released the same day by the AP was somewhat less definitive.
It opened: "The government need not subsidize art it considers indecent." Calvin
Woodward, Court Allows Limits on Art Funds, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 25, 1998, 4:02
p.m. EDT availableat http://www.washingtonpost.com.
Prominent supporters of the decency and respect provision based their initial
comments on the press reports instead of the decision itself. Newt Gingrich, then Speaker
of the House of Representatives released a statement celebrating that "the Supreme Court
validated the right of the American people to not pay for art that offends their
sensibilities." And Jay Sekulow of the American Center for Law and Justice, the Pat
Robertson-funded organization that had submitted a friend of the court brief urging the
Court to uphold the decency and respect language, announced that "[t]he American
people are no longer going to have their tax dollars used to fund filth." It was not until
days later that the "victors" were more circumspect about the Court's ruling. 'Decency'
Supporters Claim Victory: See Decision as Barring Fundingfor 'Indecent'Art, NATIONAL
CAMPAIGN FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION QUARTERLY,

Summer 1998 at pp. S1, S4.
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But these accounts were. inaccurate. Indeed, as Justice Scalia,
concurring in the Court's decision but disagreeing with its majority's
reasoning, wrote:
The operation was a success, but the patient died." What such a
procedure is to medicine, the Court's decision is to law. It sustains
the constitutionality of 20 U.S.C. §954(d)(1) by gutting it. The most
avid congressional opponents of the provision could not ask for
more.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, believed that the
decency and respect clause did indeed establish viewpoint and
content based criteria for evaluating grant applications,8' but that such
criteria were not unconstitutional. He characterized the NEA's
implementation of the statute as "so obviously inadequate that it
insults the intelligence."83
However, the initial media spin proved to have great momentum.
As Ellen Yaroshefsky, one of the lawyers representing the four artists
that brought the lawsuit wrote:
The most difficult fallout from the case is the media spin on the
loss. Most people believe this decision to be a serious setback for
free expression. The fear is that people will behave according to
their perception of the Supreme Court's opinion and will censor
themselves and the works that their institutions will sponsor.
Arts advocates echoed the concern that not only had the Court
failed to perceive a very real chilling effect that was already apparent,
but that the decision, despite its reaffirmation of the constitutional
protection due artistic expression, would serve only to enhance that
effect.84
80. Finley, 524 U.S. at 590.
81. "This is so apparent that I am at a loss to understand what the court has in mind
(other than the gutting of the statute) when it speculates that the statute is merely
,advisory'... The law unquestionably disfavors-discriminates against indecency and
disrespect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American people." Id. at 591.
82. Id. at 591. Further support for that characterization of the NEA's implementation
procedure as being ineffectual came, albeit inadvertently, from the NEA itself. In a
statement released after the Supreme Court's ruling, NEA Chairperson William Ivey said
the decision would not change the Endowment's day to day operations. Statement of
William J. Ivey, NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, June 25,1998. However, the
NEA had been enjoined by court order since 1992 from applying the decency and respect
provision. Finley 1,795 F. Supp. at 1476.
83. Yaroshefsky, Ellen, The Supreme Court Passes: No 'Realistic Danger' to First
Amendment Freedoms Perceived, NATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
QUARTERLY, Summer 1998 at § S2.
84. Justices Cold to 'Chilling Effect'; Arts Advocates: Real Effects of 'Decency' Rule
Ignored, NATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION QUARTERLY, Summer
1998, at § S1-2. As NAAO's executive director, Roberto Bedoya said, "Now we are
constrained by 'decency and respect,' but we don't know what these words mean. Instead
we must guess, behave with caution and make publicly supported art subject to whims of
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Provingthat a Funding Decision Was Viewpoint Discrimination

Following Finley, it was assumed that it would be nigh impossible
an arts organization actually to prove that the government has acted
with the intent to suppress any particular viewpoint or content. There
is likely to always be another reason, albeit pre-textual, that the
government could offer and a court is likely to defer to the
government's discretion in the absence of compelling evidence to the
contrary.
The need to identify an improper motive is critical. In a case
some twelve years earlier, a federal appeals court upheld the right of
the Governor of New Hampshire to instruct the state arts commission
to cancel a planned grant to a literary magazine. The magazine had
received state funding the previous year and had published in one of
its issues a poem that the Governor characterized as "filth." The
court, like the Supreme Court in Finley, held that in a competitive
funding situation, the subjective distaste for artwork did not raise a
constitutional issue. But, also like in Finley, the court acknowledged
that evidence of "a pattern of discrimination" against certain speakers
would "imping[e] on the basic first amendment right to free and full
debate on matters of public interest." 86 The court noted further that
"distribution of arts grants on the basis of such extrinsic
considerations as the applicants' political views, associations, or
activities would violate the equal protection clause, if not
the first
s
amendment, by penalizing the exercise of those freedoms."
4.

Esperanzaand Proofof DiscriminatoryIntent

But barely six weeks after the Supreme Court handed down its
decision in NEA v. Finley, the Esperanza Center filed a federal civil
rights lawsuit against the city of San Antonio. Esperanza claimed that
the city violated its First Amendment rights by indeed leveraging its
local arts funding mechanism into a penalty against Esperanza
because of the socio-political views expressed in Esperanza's
presentations. Esperanza also claimed that the city violated the due
process and equal protection provisions of the 14th Amendment by
penalizing Esperanza's artistic expression because of its viewpoint

governmental powers. Members of the arts community which seek support from the NEA
will once again be forced to self-censor." Id.
85. Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 793 (1st Cir. 1976).
86. Id. at 798.
87. Idt at 798 n.8.
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and by discriminating against Esperanza without any rational basis
and out of a desire to appease private animus. 88
The City's position was not entirely without legal justification.
The recognized political nature of art has subjected some works to
challenges that they are inappropriate for display in places where the
absence of political speech is important, such as courthouses. In these
instances, government may be able to exclude such art as long as it
does not discriminate against particular political viewpoints in
choosing what art to exclude. 89
The federal district court sided with Esperanza finding that the
9°
city had indeed impermissibly denied the group its funding. In so
doing, the Court rejected the city's contention that Esperanza,
because of the political quality of its art, was not truly an arts group
qualified to receive arts funding. As the court stated:
We should be most wary whenever a government official
undertakes to restrict speech because it is "too political." Labeling
expression as "political" can often serve as a proxy for suppression
of unfavored ideas. .

.

. The constitution requires viewpoint

neutrality in order to prevent government suppression of
controversial or otherwise disfavored ideas because the
categorization of speech as "political" or "controversial" is usually
to the values and attitudes of the
determined according
decisionmaker. 91
Thus once again, the values inherent in our constitutional
democracy support the role of art as a vehicle for political speech.

88. Silva, supra note 49.
89. Compare Amato v. Wilentz, 753 F. Supp. 543, 558 (D. N.J. 1990), vacated other
grounds, 952 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that Chief Justice could not deny use of
courthouse to movie crew because of views expressed in film when permission had been
granted to others) with Claudio v. United States, 836 F. Supp. 1219, 1228-30 (E.D. N.C.
1993) (holding that government could exclude political art as a category of content if it did
not discriminate against viewpoints).
Some courts, however, have questioned whether "political" is a meaningful label
to use. "Far too frequently the mantle of nonpartisanship is thrown over the shoulders of
those who have been successful in obtaining political or economic power ... while the
pejorative 'political' is reserved for those who have been less successful." Lawrence Univ.
Bicentennial Comm'n v. Appleton, 409 F. Supp. 1319, 1326 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
90. Esperanza,316 F. Supp. 2d at 436.
91. Id. at 456-57. The Court also noted that city did not administer its "no political
art" policy consistently. Several of the organizations that did receive city funding were not
primarily arts organizations or sought funding for an art project with a political element
to it.
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Conclusion
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
recognizes that artistic and creative expression is an important
medium of communication. As such, the right to create, display or
view art is as protected as the right to speak.
The creation or performance of art differs however from other
types of "expressive conduct." In other situations, the Supreme Court
treats conduct as "speech," and thus protected by the First
Amendment, only when such conduct communicates some type of
understandable message. But with art, the conduct of creating or
presenting art is seen as intrinsically part of the speech itself,
regardless of whether it conveys a message that anyone would readily
understand.
By protecting even unpopular and political artistic expression,
our legal system in this way encourages artists to use their work to
explore pressing and controversial issues. These ideals are both a
recognition of art's important historical role in political discourse, and
an affirmation that our democracy values artistic expression.

